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 It appears from her complaint and the accompanying documents that Barbara 
Griffin was hired in the 1980s to work as a “manual clerk” in the United States Postal 
Service (“USPS”).  About twenty years into Griffin’s employment, USPS directed her to 
begin “working the letter sorting machines on the evening shift.”  Griffin felt this new 
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position was incompatible with her disability.  On the advice of her labor union, Griffin 
stopped reporting to work and requested that USPS provide her with a “light duty” 
position.  Because no such position was available, Griffin’s union advised her to seek 
unemployment compensation.  The State of New Jersey denied Griffin’s application for 
unemployment benefits because she left USPS voluntarily and without documentation 
that her job “either caused or aggravated [her] medical condition.” 
 In April 2011, Griffin, proceeding pro se but not in forma pauperis, filed suit 
against USPS in federal court.  The complaint contained two allegations:  (1) “When the 
Post Office told the union to tell the employees to go home if they could not comply that 
was out of line”; and (2) “I had a bid job that I was removed from and was to request a 
light duty position, knowing there weren’t any L.D. positions available.”  For relief 
Griffin demanded “reinstatement” and “backpay.”  Griffin paid the required filing fee and 
was provided with a summons to fill out and serve on USPS.  While it appears from 
tracking information provided to the District Court that Griffin mailed something to 
USPS in July 2011, it is not clear that it was her complaint and summons. 
 The next entry on the District Court’s docket is a January 6, 2012 order of the 
Clerk, titled “NOTICE OF CALL FOR DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO LOCAL RULE 
41.1(a).”  The order explained that, since it had “been pending for more than 120 days 
without any proceeding having been taken therein,” Griffin’s lawsuit would “be 
dismissed on 1/12/2012 AT 10:00 A.M. unless good cause is shown with the filing of an 
affidavit before the return date.”  The order explained further that “[i]f said affidavit has 
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not been filed before the return date, counsel are required
 Griffin did not comply with the Clerk’s order, and her suit was dismissed without 
prejudice by the District Court on January 24, 2012.  The following day, Griffin 
submitted essentially three versions of the same letter (one typed, one hand-written, and 
one a combination of both) to the District Court.  She did not acknowledge that her case 
had been dismissed.  Instead, she stated that she had returned to work with USPS in 
September 2011.  Despite getting her job back, Griffin made clear that her “wish is to be 
made whole,” which, she explained, meant that USPS should compensate her for “All 
wages lost,” “All annual,” and “All holidays.”  She also asked that her “401k [be] 
brought up to par.”  Two weeks after submitting the letter to the District Court, Griffin 
filed a notice of appeal.         
 to appear before the Court, to 
show good cause why this action should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution.”   
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 
73, 76 (2d Cir. 2004) (“We have jurisdiction to consider [a challenge to a Rule 41(b) 
dismissal] because a dismissal without prejudice that does not give leave to amend and 
closes the case is a final, appealable order . . . .”).  We review for abuse of discretion a 
District Court’s dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) or, as was the case here, one of its 
local counterparts.  See Doe v. Megless
 We will uphold the District Court’s decision on the ground that Griffin “refused to 
proceed in accordance with the District Court’s orders.”  
, 654 F.3d 404, 411 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Id. at 411; cf. Guyer v. Beard, 
907 F.2d 1424, 1430 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[Plaintiff’s] position made adjudication of the case 
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impossible.  Therefore, any lesser sanction would not have furthered the interests of 
justice.”).  The District Court’s docket reveals that Griffin made no effort to prosecute her 
case between the time she filed her complaint and the date her case was dismissed, a span 
of almost ten months.  In Griffin’s pro se brief she states that she “was not aware of the 
fact that after winning my case I was suppose[d] to notify the courts.”  Griffin does not 
explain what case she “won” and we thus fail to grasp the significance of her statement. 
 In any event, Griffin does not claim that she never received the January 6, 2012 
order of the District Court Clerk, which should have put her on notice that her lawsuit 
was in jeopardy of being dismissed.  Griffin did not file an affidavit with the District 
Court in order to excuse her failure to prosecute, nor did she appear before the District 
Court on January 12, 2012, to do so.  See Briscoe v. Klaus
 Given these particular facts, it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court 
to dismiss Griffin’s case without prejudice for failure to prosecute.  Accordingly, the 
judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 
, 538 F.3d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 
2008) (“[A] pro se plaintiff is responsible for his failure to attend a pretrial conference or 
otherwise comply with a court’s orders.”).  There is also no clear evidence that Griffin 
ever served her complaint on USPS.   
